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Abstract 
This paper focused on the green taxes, great actuality issue in the contemporary world. As research 
method, the paper is based on economical theory of externalities, their presence making the company 
to take decisions with different social effects. Starting from social cost and private cost of human 
activity, it is a debate regarding the internalization of external costs by applying the corrective taxes.  
The purpose of this paper it is the establishing of an optimal tax level which has as effect the 
decreasing of the overall cost of a negative externality (for example, the pollution) through controlling 
the external effects.  Deriving from the analysis it has been disclosed that ideally the environmental 
taxes should be introduced over externalities source, meaning that taxes should report directly over 
emissions or environment services.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The development of the world wide economy from the past century led to the increase 
of the living standard at the world level concomitantly with the development of the production 
and offer diversification, as well to an irrational consumption of natural and human resources 
and to the environment deterioration. The Club of Rome, through it is famous report on the 
natural resources, has been the first that call attention on the fact that a continuation of the 
irrational exploitation of the resources will lead to their exhaustion and environment 
deterioration, with negative effects on the next generations [Platon, V., 2004]. 
In the traditional economical theory, the environment issues are connected with 
externalities and their presence make the economical agent to take decisions that are socially 
optional. The externalities reflect the totality of the side effects – positive or negative – of the 
human activity besides it is main purpose. 
The environment taxes include in their structure two categories [Vuţă, M., 2004]: 
- the pigouvian taxes, destined to the prices correction by take it into account of the external 
costs; this category have as purpose the optimal allocation of the resources through optimal 
internalization of the externalities; 
- the financial taxes that have as objective financing the environmental protection activity; 
In this paper we analyze the pigouvian taxes starting from the traditional economical 
theory. The purpose of this paper it is the determination of an optimal level of the tax which 
have as effect the minimization of the overall cost of an negative externality (pollution for 
example), starting from the social cost and private cost of the human activity. 
 
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
The paper starts from the economical theory of externalities, in the literature being  
well known the difference between „ private cost” and „ social cost” of an activity [Apgar, 
W.,Brown, J., 2003]. Taking into consideration the fact that the main function of State is o 
optimally allocate the attracted resources, the State could impose a tax (if an negative 
externality appears) or to grant a subsidy to internalize the externalities.  
The main function of the state it is the optimal allocation of the attracted resources and 
for this reason the state can either to impose a tax (in the case of negative externality), either 
to accord a subvention capable to internalize the externalities. Indifferently the situation, the 
analyze of the environment taxes level and establishing an optima for these ones must start 
analyzing of the social and private cost of the human activity. There is a contradiction 
between the marginal private cost and the marginal social cost that is the Pareto optimal it will 
be not attained – that assume the production level ensure the equality between the marginal 
social cost and the level of the market price. This contradiction it is watched, in the traditional 
way like a deficiency that result from the rarity of the resources, and does not have a 
correspondent in the cost terms. From the theoretically point of view this problem can be 
resolve through the existence of an property right – public or private – through what it will be 
paid the right for using the rare resources. 
For example, in the pollution case, „the property right” can be public, and from „the 
pollution rent” the state can ensure the restoration of the environment (or maintaining this 
one) in the normal limits of existence. In the conditions of this property right absence the 
difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost it is looked like an 
„external cost”, that is external for the private cost of the considered industrial unit. The 
introduction of this property right will „internalize” the external cost, that is including in the 
private sphere cost associated to the economically agent. Graphically, the problem can be 
resumed like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The private marginal cost and the social marginal cost 
 
Through "the externalities internalization" it can be obtain the social optimal like been 
equal to the private one. In the figure 2 it is represented the curve of the demanding for a 
normal product (this having the negative ramp – that is concomitantly with the price raising 
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the sold quantity will decrease) and the offer curves that are presented in a traditional way 
through the marginal cost curves. We can observe that in the conditions when we do not take 
into account the components that include the external effects, the manufacturer balance it is 
fixed in the Ep point where the production will be Qp and the product price - p1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The analyze cost – benefit of the externalities internalization 
 
In exchange, if we take into account the influence of the externalities – which will be 
included in the marginal social cost – then the balance it will move to Es, where the produced 
quantity it will be Qs, lower than Qp, and the price will be P2, higher than P1. 
It is obviously, that in these conditions we can’t expect that a competitive market to 
lead to a level of the efficient output from the social point of view (The Pareto optimal). 
Though, in the terms of cost – benefits, in the figure 2 it is represented the achievement of the 
optimal. Thus, through the moving to Es point, that can be obtained through the creation of 
market for pollution rights – for example – it is achieved the social optima. The moving from 
Ep to Es imply a series of costs and benefits. The costs that appear due to the production 
decreasing from Qp to Qs are comprised in the surface B + C which appear due to the 
consumption decreasing, respectively to the satisfaction that drift from a higher consumption. 
The benefits appear due to the decreasing of the resources consumption – which include the 
decreasing of private cost,  on the one hand (surface C), and on the other hand the decreasing 
of the external cost (surface B). Moreover, it is gained the surface A – which derive from the 
increasing of the consumer’s satisfaction following the decreasing of the external effects. 
Therefore, while the costs are represented by the surface (B + C), the benefits appear through 
the surfaces (A + B + C), the difference from them - surface A – being the net social benefit, 
which result from the moving from Ep to Es. 
Obviously, if will look from the producer point of view, these one will have more to 
lose than to gain (for these one the costs surpass the benefits), however the income appear at 
social level, the consumers loosing a part due to the increasing of the price, but gaining a 
much larger part through the decreasing of the negative external effects. 
As a consequence, if at first look the internalization of the externalities appear as a 
source to increase the prices and decreasing the produced and consummated quantities, the 
benefits  which appear surpass the costs, and it is long-expected the move from the point that 
describe the private optimal into the social one.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUTIONS 
 
To a certain extend, the external effects show an antagonism between the collective 
welfare and the private interest, the tax constitute a mean to resolve this conflict for the 
collective benefit. An important issue, which appear connected with economically and 
financial instruments, it is the one referring to the external costs special, why to tax those 
costs.  
In order to internalize the pollution cost there are used all different instruments: 
administrative, economical and financial, juridical, informational, educational. The correction 
of the free market mechanism through including the prejudice on the environment or human 
health into the decision regarding the production [P., Kageson, 1993]  can be achieved 
through economical and judicial mechanisms. The criteria on the base that should be 
appreciated the compatibility of the economical instruments with „The polluter pays” 
principle are: the cost level that come to the polluter and the existence of the proportionality 
between the level of the polluting waste and the penalties paid by the polluter. The previous 
analyze reveal that the damages for the environment can be translated into external costs, that 
is through a difference between the private costs and the social cost of an activity. A mean to 
cover this difference, in other words to internalize these externalities, it is to make the 
polluters to pay external costs through a tax inter-mediation [Bureau, D, 2000].  
In the figure 3, we consider that the AB line represent the marginal profit of a firm. In 
the absence of the externalities, the production level it will fix in the B point, point where the 
profit maximize. If the line CME represent the marginal external optimal cost corresponding 
to the firm activity (for example a river pollution), the level of the production optimal from 
the social point of view it is placed in the Q point. In the case of imposing a tax of level to the 
firm, equal with the marginal external cost corresponding to the optimal activity level, the 
marginal profit line it is moved down (PM-t) and the maximum profit it will be obtained for a 
Q level of production.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The polluting optimal 
  
The tax it is considered optimal tax because it is equal with the optimal level of the 
external cost. Therefore, we find again the notion of polluting optimal.  
In the specialty literature [JP., Pearce D,1992; Bureau, D.,2000;  Maire, J, 2002]  there 
is a series of controversy referring at the optimal tax level, authors using two notions for 
establishing the level of the polluting taxes: efficient taxes and optimal taxes. As we shown 
previously, the internalization of the environment costs it is made affecting the price of the 
resources regarding the environment and having in mind that the market does not spontaneous 
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fix such a price, it is imposed an administrated price, the intensity of using the environment 
depending of this price level. 
Certainly, the decisions of the polluters can be influenced besides the pigouvian taxes 
and others indirect taxes on merchandise or services, such as: the tax on the added value or 
excises. These are related with the environment deterioration, however due to the weak 
connection with the polluting source are in general less efficient than the taxes perceived on 
direct emission. The advantage consists in the lower administrative costs, related to the prime 
matters consumed and that are found in the invoice and account not currently used. This 
system can use very easily the existing collecting system of the taxes. For example, excises on 
the fuel or the road tax are found in the by detail price of the fuel and are evidenced in the 
invoice emitted at the buy/sell. 
The integration of the taxation in the environment politics imply the re-projection of 
the existent taxes (indirect) in order to reflect the interests regarding the environment and/or 
the introduction of the direct environment taxes (pigouvian taxes) destined to the correction of 
the external negative aspects. 
Practically, for the produced waste or for the pollution of the environment, a public 
authority must establish a price in two ways: 
• taxation direct proportionally with the produced pollution; 
• establishing of a maximal limits for the quantity of waste/pollution in the 
environment. 
The utilization of the green taxes in order to protect the environment has two possible 
objectives: to offer a stimulus to the polluters in order to decrease the pollution, the incomes 
are expected to decrease along the time and obtaining profits, in this case it is desirable a 
continuous collecting flux, which imply a continuation of the pollution. 
If in order to internalize the social costs of the pollution it is introduced a green tax on 
the pollution than we’ll have a moving of the balance point from the A point in the B point 
(fig. 4), because the selling price will rise from P1 to P2. Thus, the production of polluting 
products will decrease from Q1 to Q2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 The decreasing of the polluting products quantity through the internalization of the pollution costs 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Deriving from the analysis it has been disclosed that ideally the environmental taxes 
should be introduced over externalities source, meaning that taxes should report directly over 
emissions or environment services. From the practical point of view these are applicable over 
the products and services related to emissions. We consider that environment taxes are not 
leading only to a reduction of pollutant emissions on long term, but to an amelioration of 
companies’ competition or considered sectors. We are considering this because on short term 
it is proven that a company could react to the introduction of an environment tax thru the offer 
reduction or thru the modification of utilized raw materials structure, the result being the 
reorientation of consumers toward imported products.    
The advantage that can be obtained in the activity for pollution prevention through 
introducing the economical instruments (tax on emissions and effluence, utilization taxes, 
taxes on product, differentiation taxes, negotiable permits, subventions, collecting-guarantee 
systems, and administrative fines) are multiple. This consist in the fact that: promote a 
favorable behavior for environment protection within the polluter, through decreasing to an 
acceptable pollution level; permanently stimulate the introduction of new anti-polluting 
technologies, as they become available on the market; create conditions for developing new 
technologies more efficient and less polluting. Also, the utilization of the economically 
instruments have as effect the introduction of the environment resources into the market 
mechanism at prices reflecting their rarity, as well the opportunity cost of their utilization. In 
order to use the environment resources the users has to pay, which will have as effect the 
internalization of the external costs and pollution decreasing. 
Regarding the green taxes, there can be notified some elements that have to be taken 
into account: 
The plants from a certain activity sector will not be affected in the same way by the 
green taxes, because they use different combinations of production factors and have different 
profiles of polluting emissions; 
It has to be take it into account the market conditions and the structure of the markets, 
because at a certain moment an green tax can be transmitted and multiply the economical 
effects on many elements from that market, without necessarily inducing an environment 
positive effect on them; 
More over, to prevent the degradation of the environment, the economically 
instruments, the administrative ones (ambient standards and environmental quality, emission 
standards, technological standards, product and processing standards, permits or licenses) and 
the judicial ones (ensuring contracts against the polluting risk, responsibility for the 
environment pollution) must be utilized in a harmonious way. From the use of the standards 
and economically instruments can be notified certain advantages. In order to establish with 
clarity the responsibility for the damages of the environment or human being it is possible the 
combined used of the standards and economically instruments only on certain segments of the 
productive process as well the use of the judicial instruments.  
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